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Three Concepts of Law: The
Ambiguous Legacy of H.L.A. Hart
Brian Slattery*
The law presents itself as a body of meaning, open to discovery, interpretation,
application, criticism, development and change. But what sort of meaning
does the law possess? Legal theory provides three sorts of answers. The first
portrays the law as a mode of communication through which law-makers
convey certain standards or norms to the larger community. The law's
meaning is that imparted by its authors. On this view, law is a vehicle,
conveying a message from a speaker to an intended audience. The second
theory portrays the law as a mode of interpretation, whereby judges, officials,
and ordinary citizens make decisions about how the law applies in various
practical contexts. The law's meaning is that furnished by its interpreters.
According to this theory, law is a receptacle into which decision-makers pour
meaning. The third viewpoint argues that these theories, while not altogether
wrong, are incomplete because they downplay or ignore the autonomous
meaning that the law itself possesses. This theory suggests that the law is
basically a mode of participation, whereby legislators, judges, officials, and
ordinary people attune themselves to an autonomous field of legal meaning.
The law's meaning is grounded in a body of social practice which is independent
of both the law's authors and its interpreters and which is infused with basic
values and principles that transcend the practice. On this view, law is the
emblem of meaning that lies beyond it.
Elements of all three theories are present in H.L.A. Hart's influential
work, The Concept of Law,1 which attempts to fuse them into a single, all-
encompassing theory. Nevertheless, as we will argue here, the attempt is not
successful. Any true reconciliation of the communication and interpretation
theories can only take place within the framework of a fully-developed
participation theory. In the early stages of his work, Hart lays the foundation
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for such a theory. However, his failure to elaborate it in a thoroughgoing way
renders the work incomplete and ultimately unbalanced. As we will see, there
is something to be learned from this failure.
We will begin with a discussion of Hart's concept of the internal aspect
of law, which provides the basis for a broadly participatory approach. We will
then consider his view that law is fundamentally a mode of communication
whereby general standards of conduct are conveyed to the public. Finally, we
will assess his argument that legal interpretation is a mode of creative decision-
making necessitated by the limitations of language and the inscrutability of
the future.
I. LAW AS PARTICIPATION
Hart argues that there is a significant difference between social rules and
social habits. Rules have an "internal aspect" that habits lack. For example,
the people living in a certain village may be in the habit of going to the local
tavern on Saturday nights. Their behaviour is quite consistent on this point.
Virtually all the adult members of the community manage to drop by the
tavern, even if only briefly. However, this pattern of behaviour is not a social
rule because the villagers do not think that they "ought" to go to the tavern
or criticize others if they fail to attend. By contrast, virtually all the people in
the village go to the local church on Sunday mornings. Again, there is the
same regular pattern of behaviour. But this time there is a difference: most
members of the community believe that they "should" attend church. Not
only do they hold themselves individually to that standard, but they think
that the other villagers are likewise bound and they criticize people who fail
to attend without good reason. Here, we have not only a social habit but a
social rule.
A social rule, says Hart, exists only where at least some members of the
group look upon the activity in question as a general standard to be followed
by the group as a whole. It entails a "critical reflective" attitude to certain
standards of behaviour as a common standard. This attitude manifests itself
in criticism of others and also in self-criticism-hence its critical reflective
character. It gives rise to demands for conformity and elicits acknowledgements
that such criticism and demands are justified. These criticisms, demands, and
acknowledgements are expressed in normative language, featuring such
expressions as "ought", "must", "should", "right", and "wrong". This normative
language flows from what Hart terms the "internal viewpoint" of members of
the community.2
2 Ibid. at 55-56.
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Hart contrasts the internal viewpoint with an "external" one. Suppose an
anthropologist who is unfamiliar with the ways of our imaginary village
decides to carry out a purely behavioural study in the locality. She limits
herself to recording the observable regularities of behaviour in the village,
without taking account of the internal attitudes of group members. On the
basis of sustained observation, the anthropologist may discover strong
correlations between certain social deviations and hostile reactions and so
may be able to predict with tolerable success when departures from habitual
modes of behaviour will meet with social disapproval and when they will
not. She may discover, for example, that failure to show up at the tavern on
Saturday night does not cause adverse reactions, but failure to attend church
on Sunday does. After some time, the anthropologist might be able to predict
how group members will behave in most circumstances, enough to let her
live in the group without experiencing unpleasant consequences. However,
so long as the anthropologist sticks strictly to this "external" viewpoint and
does not take account of how the group members view their own conduct,
she will fail to render an account in terms of rules and the attendant notions
of obligation or duty. She will miss the rules' internal aspect. 3
Hart gives the example of a rigorously empirical observer who stations
himself at an intersection with a traffic light and scrutinizes the behaviour of
drivers. After some time, he is able to predict that when the traffic light turns
red, the cars will almost always stop. This external viewpoint treats the red
light as a sign that cars will stop, in somewhat the same way that thunder is
a sign of impending rain. By contrast, from the internal perspective of drivers,
the red light is a signal to stop; it embodies a rule that drivers use to regulate
their own conduct and to assess that of others. This internal viewpoint is
characteristic of rules and rule-following. 4 In a word, people adopting an
external viewpoint limit themselves to merely recording and predicting
behaviour according to rules, while those who embrace an internal viewpoint
actually use the rules as standards for appraising their own and others' conduct.5
Let us call the first group "observers" and the second group "participants".
The law, as a body of social rules, must be understood from the internal
perspective of a participant rather than from the standpoint of an external
observer. Except insofar as observers imaginatively put themselves in the
position of participants in the legal order (or actually become participants),
3 Ibid. at 86-87.
4 Ibid. at 87-88.
S Ibid. at 96.
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they cannot appreciate the nature of laws and other social rules. To this
extent, then, Hart's theory of law is participatory in its orientation.
One feature of Hart's analysis needs to be highlighted. He suggests that,
although the internal viewpoint is necessary for understanding the normative
character of rules, it is not indispensable for grasping their content. The
anthropologist, by carefully correlating social deviations with hostile reactions,
may be able to predict successfully when departures from habitual conduct
will call down sanctions. The patient observer seated at the intersection will
soon be able to anticipate when cars will stop at the traffic lights. In other
words, the content of the rules is accessible to the external observer, even if
their distinctively normative dimension is not. An internal "normative"
viewpoint is not necessary in order to grasp what the rules actually require.
But this point seems dubious. Perhaps in the case of very elementary
rules, such as that governing the conduct of drivers at traffic lights, it is
possible for an external observer to grasp the basic content of the rule
without adopting a participant's viewpoint. Even then, to move beyond a
simple correlation between "red light" and "stopping" would require some
understanding of the social institution represented by the "traffic light", as
embedded in the complex normative matrix of our highway traffic rules and
practices.
In any case, most rules are not nearly this simple or straightforward, and
most social interactions are difficult to construe from a purely external point
of view. Could an observer make sense of even the most common social
interactions in the village's tavern without some internal grasp of their
normative underpinnings? When Marc offers Jeanette a drink and she
declines, what is the significance of that simple exchange? Does Jeanette's
rejection of Marc's offer represent a tacit reproof for the "gauche" manner in
which he approached her (and how could we tell unless we had some internal
grasp of what villagers consider good and bad manners)? Or does it flow from
Jeanette's newfound conviction that drinking alcohol is "wrong" (and how
could we judge without knowing the range of religious and moral norms in
the society)? Or does it reflect the fact that Jeanette actually likes Marc a lot
and rejects his offer as a playful "ploy" (and could we even imagine that
possibility without some familiarity with the intricacies of mating norms and
rituals)? Or is it just that Jeanette thinks she has already drunk "enough" (and
how could we judge without knowing the social norms governing drinking)?
It seems unlikely that our anthropologist could ever make much sense of
villagers' behaviour in the tavern without adopting an internal point of view,
if only tacitly. It would not, of course, be necessary for the anthropologist to
accept the village's social rules as binding on her. However, she would have
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to enter imaginatively into the normative world of the villagers in order to
make sense of their goings-on. That is, she would have to put herself into the
shoes of Jeanette and Marc and consider what their interaction means to
them. Only by sympathetic identification with the internal viewpoint of
participants in the society could she hope to discover the content of its
governing standards. In other words, then, the content of most social rules
cannot be severed from their normative character; they are linked indissolubly.
The problematic nature of Hart's views on this point becomes apparent
at a later stage in his discussion. 6 He points out that most citizens in a modern
state ordinarily exhibit the internal point of view. They do not confine
themselves to recording and predicting the actions of courts or other state
officials and the probable incidence of sanctions, as an external observer
might. They accept the law as a shared standard of behaviour. Not only do
they comply with the law with tolerable regularity, but they look upon it as
a common standard for the entire community and use it as a basis for making
criticisms and demands and for acknowledging the criticisms and demands
of others. However, Hart suggests, at a certain point this internal point of
view necessarily gives way to an external perspective. This shift in attitude
stems from the fact that the meaning of a legal rule is necessarily uncertain
at its fringes, due to what Hart calls the "open texture" of the law. In that area
of uncertainty, argues Hart, "individuals can only predict how courts will decide
and adjust their behaviour accordingly."7 So, in contexts where the law is
unclear, the best that law-abiding citizens can do is to take the predictive
attitude characteristic of the external point of view. The internal aspect of
rules gives out at the point that they become uncertain. We can take an
internal attitude to legal rules only when we know what they require.
The latter point may be clarified by an example. Suppose we encounter
a sign that states: "By municipal by-law, it is forbidden to fenester in the
park". We puzzle over the sign but in the end have no real idea what it
means. Under Hart's account, we cannot be said to accept the by-law as a
common standard of conduct (except in the most formal and superficial
sense), because we do not know what that standard consists of. A minimal
knowledge of what it is that we are accepting is an essential prerequisite of
true acceptance. The best that we can do is to fall back on an external
viewpoint and guess how a court might rule.
However, this last point seems contestable. Our failure to understand the
sign not only affects our capacity to accept the by-law, it also precludes us
6 See ibid. at 134-35.
7 Ibid. at 135 [emphasis added].
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from predicting how courts might interpret it-and to the same extent. If we
have no idea what "fenester" means from an internal viewpoint, we have no
basis for forecasting how a court might rule from an external viewpoint. And
to the extent that we suspect what "fenester" means (perhaps it is some kind
of unruly behaviour), that conjecture provides a minimal basis not only for
predicting court rulings but also for accepting the rule as binding.
The point is sharpened if we consider the position of a judge called on to
apply the by-law. Which viewpoint-internal or external-should he adopt?
According to Hart, if the judge is mystified by the by-law's strange wording,
he is precluded from adopting an internal point of view because the rule's
internal aspect gives out precisely at the point that the rule ceases to be
reasonably clear. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the judge can
adopt an external viewpoint, unless he tries to predict his own probable
behaviour, which is circular. Perhaps the judge should attempt to foresee the
behaviour of a higher court sitting on appeal. However, this solution just
shunts the problem farther up the line. In the end, the highest court in the
appeal structure will have to ask itself how to approach the case.
We suggest that the only appropriate way that a judge (or for that matter
a private individual) can even conjecture, much less determine, what the by-
law might mean in this context is to consider it from an internal viewpoint. We
can have no proper basis for determining what the rule might require unless
we view it as a rule rather than as a mere description or prediction of possible
conduct. In effect, the external "predictive" point of view is parasitic on the
internal perspective. Of course, we might, in the end, decide that the by-law
does not mean anything-that it is mere nonsense. But that conclusion is
one that flows from a struggle to discern the law's internal meaning.
To appreciate this point more fully, we need to explore the other main
tenets of Hart's approach: his theories of communication and interpretation.
Although the two are closely related, it will be convenient to discuss them
separately.
II. LAW AS COMMUNICATION
A theory of communication plays a central role in Hart's analysis. 8 He argues
that law should be understood in part as a method of social control that
consists of the communication of general standards of conduct to classes of
persons, who are expected to understand and conform to these standards
without further official direction. This communication is often effected by
8 The main elements of Hart's communication theory are set out in ibid. at 121-32 and are
reiterated at 202.
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means of explicit general language, as in the case of a statute or other legislative
act, but it may also be effected by concrete example, as in the case of a judicial
precedent. In a striking passage, Hart remarks:
In any large group general rules, standards, and principles must
be the main instrument of social control, and not particular
directions given to each individual separately. If it were not
possible to communicate general standards of conduct, which
multitudes of individuals could understand, without further
direction, as requiring from them certain conduct when occasion
arose, nothing that we now recognize as law could exist. 9
We may observe that a communication has four essential elements: (1)
an author that formulates the communication; (2) a medium that carries it; (3)
a message that comprises its content; and (4) an audience that receives it.
However, if this analysis is applied to the law, it can be seen that the first and
the third elements are both problematic: rules of law frequently lack a definite
author, and in many cases their message is unclear. Let us consider first the
problem of an author and then the question of a message.
The author of a communication is the person or body that consciously
formulates the message to be delivered. However, some forms of law have no
identifiable author in this sense. The most obvious example is furnished by
customary law, which is generated by the immemorial practice of a community.
While there is perhaps an identifiable "law-maker" in the collective person of
the community, this law-maker obviously has no single mind capable of
consciously framing a "message" to be delivered. The innumerable individual
actions that give rise to a custom are accompanied by a great variety of
psychological states and animated by a great variety of purposes. It would be
straining the point to say that the myriad performers of these actions collectively
constitute an "author" speaking to future generations, except in a
metaphorical sense. 10
Nevertheless, it could be argued that there is no need for an author who
consciously formulates the message to be communicated. So long as there is
some person or body that actually generates the message, the requirement of
an author is satisfied. However, this argument confuses communication with
9 Ibid. at 121.
10 Curiously, Hart discusses the difficulties that customary law poses for the theory that law
consists of coercive orders (ibid. at 43-48); however, he does not address the similar problems
that customary law presents for a communication theory.
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transmission. Of course it is possible for a traditional pattern of conduct to
be passed down through the generations without conscious effort or design,
just as it is possible for a mother unconsciously to transmit a certain way of
speaking to her children, who imitate the characteristic lilt of their mother's
speech. However, it would be wrong to say that the woman communicates
her speech patterns to her children, except in an extended, analogical sense.
Nevertheless, if the woman takes it upon herself to correct her children's
manner of speech in a deliberate manner, then the process shifts from mere
transmission to conscious communication.
The problem of an author is not confined to customary law; it also arises
with statutes passed by legislatures. As Anglo-Canadian courts have often
remarked, a legislative assembly has no "mind" as such, and it is fruitless to
search for an empirical "legislative intent" in a collection of disparate people
with varying goals, conceptions and levels of awareness, such as compose the
ordinary legislature. If the message communicated by a statute consisted of
the actual psychological states of those responsible for drafting and passing
the law, the content of the statute would be diffuse, scattered, and likely
incoherent. Given that both statutes and customary laws lack an "author"
capable of formulating a conscious intent, it seems inappropriate to characterize
the law as a mode of communication.
Let us turn now to the question of law's "message". Here, Hart is well
aware of the difficulties in a pure communication theory. He concedes that
the message delivered by a statute or a judicial precedent can never be
completely clear and unequivocal. While the message will normally have a
core of unproblematic meaning, it will also necessarily have a penumbra of
uncertainty, where the meaning becomes vague or obscure. Hart explains
that this uncertainty results in part from the open texture of language but
just as importantly from our inability to predict all future situations and our
consequent indeterminacy of aim. The inherent uncertainty of the law gives
rise to the need for creative interpretation. We will postpone our detailed
examination of Hart's theory of interpretation until the next section and
focus here on the question of how far the law can be viewed as a message.
In some contexts, the communication theory seems intuitively right.
Consider the example of a municipal by-law posted at the entrance to a park
stating "No vehicles in the park". 1 1 Here the law addresses a matter that is
not governed by uniform or settled social standards. Some parks allow vehicles,
while others do not. It is for the municipal authorities to decide whether a
11 Hart uses this example on a number of occasions; see, e.g., ibid. at 123-26.
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particular park will be open to vehicles. This decision has to be communicated
to the general public, for otherwise they cannot know how to conduct
themselves. Moreover, the content of the law (the message) is arguably fairly
specific. The by-law forbids people to bring a fairly well-defined range of
mechanical devices ("vehicles") into a fairly well-defined area (the "park").
While we may debate whether a child's toy car is a vehicle within the provision's
meaning, by and large the rule has an unproblematic operation over a large
range of common situations, sufficient for ordinary people to know how they
should behave in most cases.
Nevertheless, the matter is not as simple as it first appears. We may
observe that the by-law only makes sense in a certain cultural and social
context. Although both vehicles and parks are material objects, they are also
cultural artefacts defined by their social significance and functions. The term
"vehicles", as used in the by-law, does not refer to objects of a specific size,
shape, or material properties. It is a purposive concept encompassing a wide
variety of objects that serve certain ends. An effort to define "vehicles" in
terms of specific material attributes would surely misfire and include objects
that clearly are not vehicles for the rule's purposes and exclude others that
just as clearly are. By the same token, a "park" is not just a tract of land
consisting of lawns, trees, paths, ponds, and so on; it is a sophisticated social
institution whereby a certain area is dedicated to a range of specific public
uses (such as picnics, baseball, sun-tanning, or simply strolling about), which
in turn serve certain abstract values and principles (such as "health",
"recreation", "sociability", and "the equal access of all members of the
community"). Our understanding of the by-law is informed by the larger
cultural realities represented by the terms "vehicles" and "parks" and, more
importantly, by our grasp of the normative dimensions of those realities when
juxtaposed in the manner suggested in the by-law.
Consider a slightly different case, where the sign states "No laughing in
the park". While at one level the language of the sign is clear, we would still
be puzzled as to what it actually means. Why? Because it seems to lack an
appropriate normative context. Why should laughing be forbidden in the
park (of all places) when one can laugh to one's heart's content on the sidewalk
just outside? What connection is there between the behaviour prohibited
and the purposes ordinarily served by a park? If a court had to interpret the
by-law, it would probably search for some appropriate normative context in
which the prohibition makes sense. It might decide, for example, that the
law should be read as aimed only at laughter that is so excessively loud,
offensive, or malicious that it prevents others from enjoying the park. Or
perhaps it might conclude that this particular park (unlike most others) is
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wholly dedicated to the quiet contemplation and enjoyment of nature and
that the prohibition of laughing is a specific manifestation of a broader norm
forbidding any form of noisy activity.
In effect, then, when we come across a sign that takes the form "No
[specified activity] in the park", we normally read it as a particular instance of
the underlying norm "No inappropriate activity in the park", where "inappropriate"
is understood in light of the well-understood purposes of the park and the
basic principles that support and further these purposes. If the activity specified
by the sign does not seem to affect any of these purposes and principles, we
will have difficulty understanding and applying the sign.
So, even in the relatively straightforward case of a park by-law, the theory
that the law communicates a certain "message" turns out to be simplistic. As
we have seen, the by-law functions in part by calling attention to norms that
exist apart from the by-law and that are embodied in overlapping strata of
social practice, which in turn are saturated with basic values and principles.
To portray the law as a message conveying the ideas of its authors obscures
the fact that the law ordinarily functions by calling attention to larger normative
realities and by eliciting in citizens, judges, and officials reasonable decisions in
light of those realities. This point brings us to the final element of Hart's
theory: his account of the decision-making process.
III. LAW AS INTERPRETATION
As noted, Hart acknowledges that the two main modes of legal communication
(precedent and legislation) both leave room for doubt on the part of the
intended audience. Where the legal standard is embodied in a judicial decision,
there is inevitably some uncertainty as to the range of cases that the precedent
governs. However, even when explicit general language is used, as is the case
with legislation, there is still an element of uncertainty. In part, this uncertainty
is due to the irreducibly open-ended character of any natural language.
However, it also results from the fact that we are human beings-not all-
knowing gods. We have to cope with two interconnected handicaps: relative
ignorance of fact and relative indeterminacy of aim. We cannot foresee all
the possible combinations of circumstances that may arise in the future. As a
result, we are not in a position to decide in advance how unanticipated cases
should be resolved. So it would be misguided to entertain the ideal of laws so
comprehensive and detailed that they resolve in advance every possible case
and never need to be supplemented by fresh decisions. For our inability to
anticipate the limitless range of concrete situations that the future holds in
store necessarily limits our capacity to decide those situations in advance. 12
12 Ibid. at 124-26.
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All legal systems, observes Hart, represent a compromise between two
social needs. The first is the need for clear rules that individuals can apply for
themselves in most common situations, without having to resort to official
guidance. The second, however, is just as important: the need to leave open
a range of concrete issues that can be properly appreciated and settled by
official decision only when they arise. As a result, the law cannot be viewed,
even at the ideal level, simply as a mode of communication whereby an
omniscient law-maker provides clear directions to citizens as to how they
should conduct themselves in all possible circumstances. There is also the
need for contextual decision-making as situations come up. 13
So, the communication theory of law needs to be supplemented by a
theory of decision-making. What form should that theory take? Hart
explains:
Faced with the question whether the rule prohibiting the use of
vehicles in the park is applicable to some combination of
circumstances in which it appears indeterminate, all that the
person called upon to answer can do is to consider (as does one
who makes use of a precedent) whether the present case resembles
the plain case 'sufficiently' in 'relevant' respects. The discretion
thus left to him by language may be very wide; so that if he
applies the rule, the conclusion, even though it may not be arbitrary
or irrational, is in effect a choice. He chooses to add to a line of
cases a new case because of resemblances which can reasonably be
defended as both legally relevant and sufficiently close. In the
case of legal rules, the criteria of relevance and closeness of
resemblance depend on many complex factors running through
the legal system and on the aims or purpose which may be
attributed to the rule. To characterize these would be to characterize
whatever is specific or peculiar in...legal reasoning.1 4
In effect, once we move beyond the unproblematic core of a legal rule
into the penumbra of uncertainty, legal decision-making necessarily entails a
form of creative choice-a choice that is not necessarily arbitrary or irrational
but nonetheless one that does not consist of syllogistic reasoning or the simple
subsumption of the particular under the general.1s In Hart's view, such
13 Ibid. at 127.
14 Ibid. at 124.
15 Ibid.
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decision-making involves a distinctive form of legal reasoning that entails
choosing between alternatives on the basis of "whether the present case
resembles the plain case 'sufficiently' in 'relevant' respects", which depends
on the rule's presumed "aims and purposes" as well as "many complex factors
running through the legal system". But what, more specifically, does that
mode of legal reasoning entail and how far does it represent simple "choices"
as opposed to something else? Indeed, what does Hart mean by "choice" in
this context? After all, even when applying a legal rule to a plain case, a court
still makes the choice to apply it, for it could conceivably decide to do otherwise.
On this point, Hart attempts to strike a middle path. On the one hand,
he argues that in the penumbra of uncertainty surrounding legal rules, legal
decision-makers are not governed by the general standards communicated
in the law but are free to make choices that the law leaves open. To this
extent, Hart distances himself from the legal formalists. However, he also
maintains that in making these choices legal decision-makers do not necessarily
act in an arbitrary or irrational manner but engage in a distinctive mode of
legal reasoning. So doing, he distinguishes his approach from that of the legal
sceptics. However, what warrants the claim that the process involves reasoning,
as opposed to mere choice, and in what sense is this reasoning distinctively
legal?
Hart's eventual answer comes in a brief discussion toward the end of his
work where he concedes that the interpretive process often shows the influence
of morality and broad notions of justice. 16 In making the choices that the
open texture of the law permits, judges are guided by the assumption that the
purposes of legal rules are reasonable-that they do not lead to injustice or
violate moral principles. However, these moral considerations do not eliminate
the need for choice, since "it is folly to believe that where the meaning of the
law is in doubt, morality always has a clear answer to offer." 17 Still, these
choices are not necessarily arbitrary but display characteristic judicial
virtues, three of which merit mention: impartiality and neutrality in weighing
the available alternatives, consideration of the interests of all those affected
by the decision, and a concern to display the decision as rationally grounded
in some acceptable general principle. While these moral principles and factors
are clearly important to the interpretive process, argues Hart, they do not
demonstrate any necessary connection between law and morals. For they
have been honoured almost as much in the breach as in the observance.
Indeed critics have often censured judicial law-making for its blindness to
social values, its mechanical nature, and its inadequate reasoning.
16 Ibid. at 199-201.
17 Ibid. at 200.
The Ambiguous Legacy of H.L.A. Hart 335
This is the gist of Hart's theory of interpretation. How adequate is it? We
wish to argue that it has two related deficiencies. First, despite the belated
concession to moral values and principles, Hart's analysis betrays the imprint
of the view that the interpretation of legal rules is basically akin to the
application of descriptive statements. As such, the analysis downplays the
distinctive normative character of social rules, their internal aspect-the very
thing that (as Hart has argued) serves to distinguish rules from mere
descriptions or predictions of social habits. Second, as a result of this tacit
bias, Hart tends to treat legal interpretation as comprising two alternative
processes: (1) the relatively unproblematic application of general descriptive
terms to particular cases that fall within the core meaning of those terms; and
(2) the exercise of creative choice when those terms are applied to cases that
fall within the penumbra of doubt. In neither instance does Hart give full
credit to the normative character of the interpretive process; once again, in
effect, he forgets his own best lesson, that the law must be seen from the
internal viewpoint.
Hart's descriptive bias emerges when he suggests that the process of
statutory interpretation basically involves the classification of particular cases
under general terms. As he writes:
All rules involve recognizing or classifying particular cases as
instances of general terms, and in the case of everything which
we are prepared to call a rule it is possible to distinguish clear
central cases, where it certainly applies and others where there are
reasons for both asserting and denying that it applies. Nothing
can eliminate this duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra
of doubt when we are engaged in bringing particular situations
under general rules. This imparts to all rules a fringe of vagueness
or 'open texture'.... 18
It seems significant that Hart borrows the concept of "open texture"
from Friedrich Waismann, who argues that most of our empirical concepts
have an open texture, in contrast to the "closed texture" of mathematical
concepts. 19 Waismann suggests that this feature explains, in part, why an
experiential statement can never be verified in a conclusive way. He explains:
18 Ibid. at 119-20.
19 Waismann's discussion is found in an essay entitled "Verifiability", reproduced in A. Flew, ed.,
Logic and Language (First Series) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952) 117; see especially his analysis
at 118-24. Hart acknowledges his debt to Waismann in a note in The Concept of Law, supra
note 1 at 249.
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Try as we may, no concept is limited in such a way that there is
no room for any doubt. We introduce a concept and limit it in
some directions; for instance, we define gold in contrast to some
other metals such as alloys. This suffices for our present needs,
and we do not probe any farther. We tend to overlook the fact that
there are always other directions in which the concept has not
been defined. And if we did, we could easily imagine conditions
which would necessitate new limitations. In short, it is not possible
to define a concept like gold with absolute precision, i.e. in such
a way that every nook and cranny is blocked against entry of
doubt. That is what is meant by the open texture of a concept. 20
However, this analysis cannot be transferred to the law without significant
amendment. Legal rules are quite different from empirical propositions: they
are normative "ought" statements rather than experiential "is" statements.
Not only that, but the concepts employed in such rules gain their meaning
in part from the normative context in which they function. In effect, legal
concepts are fragments of normative statements rather than simple descriptive
terms. Once a term is drawn into a normative field, its centre of gravity may
shift and its descriptive core shrink or expand. As a result, the meaning of a
term may differ depending on whether it occurs in a normative or descriptive
context. It is one thing to determine whether a particular object is a "vehicle"
as a matter of empirical classification and another to apply the norm "No
vehicles in the park" to a concrete situation. Applying the law is not an
exercise in empirical classification; even in the plainest of cases, it is a matter
of normative judgment.
Consider, for example, the descriptive statement "There are no vehicles
in the park today". To verify the statement we would have to survey all the
objects in the park and determine in each case whether the object qualifies
as a "vehicle" in the term's ordinary sense of "a means of conveyance or
transport". While most objects would pose no real problems in classification,
a few might prove troubling. Automobiles, trucks, bicycles, baby carriages,
wheelchairs, and wagons are all means of conveyance and so would clearly
qualify as "vehicles". However, rollerblades might raise a more difficult issue.
As Hart points out, resolving that issue would involve making a choice in
light of the similarities and differences between rollerblades and the devices
that clearly count as vehicles in everyday language.
20 Waismann, ibid. at 120.
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Predictive statements are basically similar to descriptive statements in
this respect. Take, for example, the proposition "There will be no vehicles in
the park tomorrow". To verify the accuracy of this prediction, we would have
to visit the park on the following day and examine the range of objects
encountered there. Once again, the word "vehicles" would be applied in its
everyday sense and once again we would have to make choices in order to
determine whether certain marginal devices should count as "vehicles" or
not.
Consider now the normative statement "No vehicles in the park". One
obvious difference between this statement and its descriptive and predictive
counterparts is the fact that it cannot be verified by an empirical survey. The
park might in fact contain a number of cars and yet the statement could still
hold true. More important for our immediate purposes, however, is the fact
that the statement's coverage would differ from that of its descriptive and
predictive cousins.
For example, while "No vehicles in the park" would clearly include cars,
trucks, and buses, it would likely not include baby carriages, even though
these are clearly means of conveyance and match the dictionary meaning of
the term. The normative field in which the term "vehicles" is suspended
transforms the term's meaning. It does not make much sense to ban baby
carriages from the park, given the values and principles that parks serve. If we
change the normative field, the term's meaning will change accordingly.
Consider a sign on a golf course that reads "No vehicles on the greens". Here,
by contrast, we would have little difficulty concluding that the sign covers
baby carriages, along with cars, golf carts, bicycles, and so on. We make this
practical judgment in light of the normative reality to which the sign draws
our attention. The "greens" are part of a complex social institution (the game
of "golf"), which in turn embodies certain basic values and principles
("recreation", "the cultivation of certain skills and virtues", "health", "mental
tranquillity", "companionship and mutual regard", and the like). In light of
this normative reality, we make reasonable judgments about the kinds of
vehicles likely to harm greens in ways that significantly detract from the
game of golf and the basic values and principles it serves.
In the case of the park sign, the main effect of the normative context is
to narrow somewhat the scope of the term "vehicles", so that the ordinary
descriptive reach of the word is curtailed. However, in some contexts, the
normative field might also broaden the word's scope. For example, in verifying
the descriptive statement "There are no vehicles in the park", we might
decide not to treat remote control model cars as vehicles, on the ground that
these devices are not actually used to convey anything. Nevertheless, we
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might possibly reach a different conclusion in applying the sign "No vehicles
in the park", on the ground that the model cars are noisy and possibly hazardous
to others and generally detract from the park's tranquil ambiance.
As these simple examples show, even statements about relatively concrete
objects (such as vehicles and parks) may have a somewhat different meaning
depending on whether they are descriptive or normative and, in the latter
case, on their specific character. Of course, the effect of a normative field is
amplified once we move to more abstract statements, such as "Every individual
is equal before and under the law" or "Everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure". The legal term "equal" will clearly
differ substantially in meaning from its purely descriptive counterpart: the
fact that two individuals are unequal in height obviously does not make
them unequal before the law. Moreover, the legal term "unreasonable" has no
definite descriptive content at all but points to an autonomous normative reality
and enjoins practical judgments in light of that reality.
So, legal interpretation cannot be characterized as either the application
of general descriptive terms to particular cases (on Hart's empiricist account
of "unproblematic" cases) or as the exercise of creative decision-making (on
his account of "hard" cases). In all cases, legal interpretation involves the
exercise of normative judgment. Indeed, it is only the normative context that
allows us to identify the "unproblematic" cases and to distinguish them from
the "hard" cases. In short, the import of legal rules cannot be understood by
someone who takes a purely external viewpoint. Law does not merely wear
an "internal aspect"; it is internal to the core.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have argued that the content of legal rules cannot be severed from their
normative character; the two are inextricably intertwined. The only appropriate
way for a judge, official or private individual to determine what the law
means is to consider it from an internal viewpoint. We can have no proper
basis for determining what a legal rule requires unless we view it as a rule
rather than as a mere description or prediction of possible conduct. In effect,
the external attitude to rules is parasitic on the internal perspective.
Considered from an internal point of view, the law cannot be characterized
principally as a mode of communication. Neither statute nor custom has a
definite "author" capable of formulating a conscious intent. Moreover, the
view that the law conveys a certain "message" oversimplifies the matter. As
we have seen, a legal rule functions in part by calling attention to norms
embodied in a finely-spun web of social practice, which displays certain basic
values and principles. To portray the law as a message conveying the intentions
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of its authors obscures the fact that the law operates by summoning up these
larger normative realities and eliciting in citizens, judges, and officials reasonable
decisions in light of those realities.
Legal rules are significantly different from empirical propositions: they
are normative "ought" statements rather than experiential "is" statements.
The concepts deployed in such rules derive their meaning in part from the
normative matrix in which they occur. Legal concepts are fragments of
normative propositions rather than simple descriptive terms. So the import
of a legal term may vary depending on its setting. Applying the law is never
simply a matter of empirical classification; even in the most obvious of cases,
it involves the exercise of normative judgment.
These, then, are the lessons to be drawn from our analysis of Hart's theory.
In the end they boil down to one basic point: the only satisfactory theory of
law is one that illuminates the internal structure of law from a genuinely
participatory point of view. If this brief paper does not present such a theory
in any detail, hopefully it gestures in the right direction.2 1
21 For a fuller account of a participatory theory, see B. Slattery, "Law's Meaning" (1996) 34
Osgoode Hall L.J. 553.
